Guns, Gangs, and the Illusion of Security

by Lilian Elochukwu Terna-Ayua

The 5th of February saw the expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia. For the first time in decades, there are no legally binding caps on the world’s two largest nuclear powers, and no formal verification process ensuring transparency between the two countries. The icon of restraint in nuclear proliferation now stands dismantled with uncertainty of extension. The end of New START is not just a diplomatic event, but a metaphor that influences global events as guardrails weaken, weapons proliferate, and surveillance expands, while the root causes of violence remain unexamined. Either at the core of nuclear deterrence or of neighbourhood policing, modern security policy often mistakes force for stability.

Global military expenditure surpassed $2.2 trillion in 2023, as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sustainable security is not culturally bound but structurally cultivated, as in nations such as Colombia through community-based reintegration programs, which combine economic opportunities with violence reduction measures following demobilisation. Japan’s low homicide rates result from policing, strong community trust, social cohesion, and equal access to social infrastructures. These examples suggest that prevention-centred security models are viable beyond the United States and Russia.

440,000 people die yearly from homicide worldwide, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Security budgets are expanding, yet insecurity is rising in homes, communities, and cities. This paradox raises an ethical question: is violence primarily a failure of individual morality, or is it a foreseeable outcome of institutional neglect long before harm occurs?

Security Paradox

Many countries ‌equate force, tougher sentencing, stronger borders, increased surveillance, and larger defence budgets with security. These measures are politically visible and signal control by the government, just to reassure the electorate that something is being done. Yet evidence has consistently shown that militarised responses do little to address the root drivers of violence. Urban gang recruitment, for instance, results from school dropout, unemployment, homelessness, and social marginalisation. Where opportunity is absent, informal power fills the gap.

Research in criminology and public health has shown that early intervention in access to good health, quality education, mental health support, employment opportunities, and youth mentorship results in violence reduction in communities. A good example is Scotland’s Violence Reduction Unit’s reframing of gang violence as a public health issue rather than solely a criminal justice issue. Through this, Scotland has seen a great decline in youth homicide rates. In the US, the Cure Violence model treats violence as a public health issue by mediating conflicts before they escalate through a violence interrupter. These examples show that prevention strategies and social investment can produce sustainable and measurable reductions in violence. However, when the preventive system fails, violence becomes imminent and recurrent. It ceases to shock but becomes predictable. Force only manages the symptoms of insecurity rather than resolving it.

Just War Theory and Human Security

Under the Classical Just War Theory, force may be morally justified under strict conditions such as proportionality, just cause, and lawful authority. However, these principles were designed for armed conflict resolution between political parties. The patterns of violence seen in contemporary cities are not traditional warfare nor a clash of armies, but a manifestation of social fractures.

This contrasts with the Human Security Framework developed by the United Nations Development Programme, which focuses on protecting people rather than territories. For it defines security as freedom from fear and freedom from want. This is profound because if discrimination, institutional failure, social exclusion, and poverty are sources of insecurity for societies, then weapons alone cannot resolve them.

This reframing is key as it challenges dominant security narratives and suggests military abilities cannot measure that security but by reductions in school exclusions. If insecurity grows from social fragmentation then social investment is required for sustainable security. Violence prevention and policing are only a temporary solution that address immediate harm.

When Protection Becomes Harm, What Happens Next?

Deterrence in international relations equates to arms accumulation, yet sustained militarisation frequently triggers arms races and regional instability. More weapon accumulation is often miscalculated as safer than the probability of miscalculation. At the grassroots level, over-policing without parallel social investment can deepen mistrust and exclusion for communities that feel disadvantaged. This usually fuels further gang recruitment. For example, the recent war between the US and Israel against Iran illustrates the limits of deterrence security. Rather than exhausting diplomacy and social structural interventions, military force was used, and this risks reinforcing the illusion that security can be attained basically through dominance.

Security built on domination is fragile. Security built on justice is durable.

Critics may argue that prevention is a long-term investment that cannot address immediate threats such as organised crime, terrorism, and more. This concern is valid. Yet states have a duty to protect citizens from insecurity, and emergency response and structural prevention are not interchangeable. The gap arises when there is failure in parallel investment in prevention, but more investment in reactive force, then the state becomes enslaved in cycles of recurring crises, enforcement rather than addressing the root causes.

The question remains: If prevention is more cost-effective morally and economically, why does policy remain reactive? Some answers are rooted in political incentives, as tough security measures usually yield visible results and symbolic reassurance, while prevention produces slow outcomes that are more sustainable.  It is fast to characterise violence as the acts of bad actors in society rather than address deep-rooted inequalities which breed this violence. Reactive policy is expensive, yet the cumulative cost of intergenerational trauma, emergency healthcare, economic recession, and incarceration exceeds the investment required for early intervention. Truly, the illusion of security is often financially unsustainable.

Policy Reorientation

It can be challenging transitioning from a military security approach to prevention-focused strategies because of institutionally entrenched defence and policing budgets, supported by economic interests and political constituencies. Reallocating resources for social investment programmes most times requires ideological shifts and political courage amidst the opposition that might rise, coupled with the tortoise prevention outcomes. Yet, it is essential to address these barriers for a credible reform rather than an aspirational one.

The purpose of policies is not merely paperwork. In the same light, disarmament and non-proliferation awareness should not be confined to international treaties but should inform how states think of security domestically. A key policy shift could mean reducing military spending to increase education and youth employment funding, embedding violence prevention in public health strategies, and to control international arms. Security measures are not about defence capability only, but also through measures in reduction of poverty, gang violence, and social exclusion. This is not abstract activism, but strategic claims grounded in empirical evidence. Internationally, states require defence systems; the question is not on their existence but prioritising prevention or reaction.

When protection camouflages as escalation, then security becomes a routine rather than protection. And when violence follows predictable lines of neglect, both domestic and in geopolitics, then ethical leadership demands structure, not more force, and security becomes a routine or an illusion.